The perspective we take on a system determines the features and properties of the system that we focus on. It determines where we search for causes to explain the effects on the system that we observe. It determines the terms in which we expect the information about the system to be expressed. And it can also influence the choice of formalism that will be used to convey the information. This paper proposes to start making these considerations concrete in order to draw a practical benefit out of them.
Prototypes of networks
To illustrate those five observations, we are going to use a minimalist mathematical prototype of interaction systems named Boolean Automata Networks (BANs).
I will introduce the formalism of BANs using the BAN N represented below in Fig.1 . N is comprised of n " 6 entities, namely 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 , a.k.a. automata 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Each automaton i P V " 1, n has a variable state in B " t0, 1u. If @i P V, x i denotes the current state of i, then x " px 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n q P B of N , if 1 , 2 , and 4 are updated, and 3 , 5 , and 6 aren't, then N transitions to state x 1 " pf 1 pxq, f 2 pxq, x 3 , f 4 pxq, x 5 , x 6 q " p0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1q.
Formally, a BAN is defined as a set of Boolean functions N " tf i : B n Ñ B | i P V u with no mention to automata updates. A BAN is therefore not a dynamical system. This choice of definition is deliberate although nontraditional. In the literature, Automata
Networks (ANs) are usually taken to represent dynamical systems [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Their definitions are made to imply specific updating conditions. The notions of causality and time are thereby fused together and a distinction is implied between (1) process of change and (2) (result of) change -the latter being either an approximation of the former or an observed consequence of it. The object of this paper requires to take a less abstract view on the formalism, and not make this semantical distinction, so:
Change is anything that has observable consequence, if only the observable consequence of us noticing it. Process of change is change if it has observable consequence in itself; if it hasn't, then it's not something there is anything to be said about.
In agreement with the formalism of BANs, we will assume that in a BAN, all considered changes are represented with the same status. The focus is therefore not so much on automata states, as it is on their changes.
Illustrations

OBSERVATION 1:
Some properties that we regard as properties of interaction systems -properties that they can have or not have -are actually properties of the way we look at them.
Observation 1 can be illustrated with the BAN properties of monotony and nonmonotony. A BAN is said to be monotone when the following holds for any two of its automata i and j . If i influences j , then it always does so in the same way: either i always influences j positively, or i always influences j negatively. In mathematical terms this translates to the following wherex
n is the state defined by @k ‰ i :
By definition, in a monotone BAN, for any i, j P V such that pi, jq P A, i.e. such that the Conjunctive Normal Form of f j pxq depends on x i :
Traditionally, when BANs model biological (genetic) regulation networks [12, 15, [29] [30] [31] , they are supposed to be monotone, like BAN N of Fig Every time we witness 1 change states, 4 just has. While N is taking trajectory:
we observers are just seeing:
The BAN description of a system that behaves like this is the BAN description given in Fig.2 . Under such circumstances -circumstances that constrain the temporality of events in N together with the way we observe those events, the level of abstraction from which we do that, and the temporality of our observations of N 's changes with respect to the temporality of N 's changes -what is given of N for us to understand is
In agreement with Observation 1, this shows that monotony and non-monotony are not so much properties qualifying the interactions of a system as they are of how we look at it.
In the literature, wherever BANs are considered as stand-alone mathematical objects, it is customary to restrict the local update functions f i to a certain class of functions for convenience. A typical example is the restriction to functions that are expressible in terms of a limited number of logical connectors [2, 7, 9, 32-36, 21, 22, 37, 38] . And as mentioned above, the f i 's are also often restricted to functions that are expressible, on the contrary, without certain connectors such as the ' (XOR) connector which makes the BAN severely non-monotone [39, 40, 37, 41] .
If we want the mathematical understanding we develop about mathematical representations of 'real' interaction systems to apply and to apply rightly, then we need to understand the meaning of the restrictions we make when we derive this mathematical understanding. Observation 1 shows how important it is to consider thoroughly the way our perspective on a system and our interpretation of its representation are involved in the properties that we build our understanding on.
OBSERVATION 2:
A statement like "There exists no interaction between entity X and entity Y." has no essential meaning in itself. Its truth value is dependent on the specific level of abstraction from which the system -its entities, the interactions between them -is being looked at.
OBSERVATION 3:
Incomplete data is not the only reason for the model of a real interaction system to fail to account for existing interactions between entities of the system. Despite the modeller's flawless observation and formalisation of the system, some causal relationships between entities might still be intrinsically imperceptible to him/her under his/her current perspective.
To illustrate observations 2 and 3, consider the system represented by BAN r N of Fig.3 . This system is actually three independent systems that we have no reasons to consider as a whole. Automaton 1 in particular, is stuck in state 0. There is no reason for us to consider 1 as an interacting entity interacting with other entities. Yet in some circumstances, this BAN too is the perfect representation of what is given of system N (of Fig.1 ) for us to understand.
Imagine that entities 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 of N happen to be caught in the same rhythm, and for the same sort of reasons as before, we are unaware of entity 4 (e.g. we are looking at interactions between varying concentrations i i ‰ 4 in the cell of different proteins, and are thereby unable to perceive changes affecting genes like 4 ).
In N , everything is as if updates were being made in the following periodic order:
. . . of the regularity of our observations with respect to that, while N takes trajectory:
So under these circumstances, r N accurately represents all the information we get out of our absolutely flawless observation of N under those circumstances. And according to this accurate representation of N , in particular there exists no interaction between entities 1 and 5 : p1, 5q R r A.
Traditionally in the Bioinformatics literature [42] [43] [44] [45] , at best only three cases are considered for any two entities i and j of a real system N : CASE 1: Entity i really impacts on entity j , possibly indirectly, and the model r N of N formalises this through the arc pi, jq P r A.
CASE 2: Entity i really has no influence on entity j and the model accounts for this through the absence of arc pi, jq R r A.
CASE 3: Entity i really impacts on entity j but the experimental data collected upstream by biologists has failed to evidence this fact about reality. As a consequence, the theory is failing to represent it: arc pi, jq P r A is accidentally missing from r N 's interaction graph r G " p r V , r Aq.
In agreement with Observation 2, the example of BAN r N of Fig.3 modelling system N of Fig.1 shows that CASE 2 doesn't make any sense at all beyond the 'reality' of a specific level of abstraction (e.g. the one at which concentrations i i ‰ 4 of proteins in the cell are meaningful and visible, and a gene 4 isn't).
In agreement with Observation 3, the example also evidences there can be other reasons -different from the "unfortunate data deficit" underpinning CASE 3 -for the representation r N of a system N to fail to account for interactions between entities. Now, consider again r N -the BAN of Fig.3 representing precisely what we see of the system N of Fig.1 
OBSERVATION 4:
What information a formal object can provide about the real system it is meant to model, and what uninterpretable, non-modelling information it provides on top of that, does not just depend on the semantics associated to the formalism describing the formal object, it also essentially depends on the relative consistency of the semantics.
OBSERVATION 5:
The semantics associated to a formal object can be decisively affected by the history of the object and how our scientific community came to inherit it. And thus, so can the precise definition of the object that we choose among different customary variations of the definition, and the properties it has that we take interest in, and those we don't.
The last two observations can be illustrated with the notion of "synchronism".
A surprisingly great many occidental modellers of biological regulation networks confuse synchronism in BANs with the parallel update schedule (PUS) of BANs [8, [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] .
The PUS is the update schedule originally used and made sense of by McCulloch and Pitts in their seminal BANs [60] . The PUS forces a BAN to systematically update all its automata so that @x P B n , the BAN transitions from x to pf 1 pxq, . . . , f n pxqq P B n .
When this makes some automata react more quickly than we would like them to, intermediary automata can simply be added as it was originally done in the McCulloch and Pitts BANs. Asynchronism, to which the PUS is wrongly opposed, is the update constraint that rules out the possibility of updating more than one automaton in x.
Non-asynchronism, a.k.a synchronism is the possibility of updating more than one in x.
Formally, it is expressed by: |U pxq| ą 1 (more than 1 automata can change states in x).
Such great tenacity for such a coarse confusion can only be explained by the fact that wherever it is made, it does not matter, or at least, it is not made to matter.
A widespread confusion is nonetheless still is a confusion. Since it is widespread, in agreement with Observation 5, it is much more likely to be the legacy of a community blind spot induced by inherited semantics, than to be the responsibility of individual err.
And indeed, the blind spot around synchronism seems to be a natural effect of the constant diverse historical reprocessing of BANs and of the way sense is made out of them [5, [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] . Extensive interdisciplinary interest in BANs has been reassigning modelling responsibilities to BANs faster then it has been answering questions about what BANs can, and actually do formalise.
The confusion between the parallel update schedule and the notion of synchronism results in:
(1) The neglect of all intermediary updating possibilities that neither rule out synchronism altogether, nor rule out asynchronism altogether (around 2 . . . The disregard synchronism owes in particular to its misguided association with determinism, is aggravated by two assumptions commonly used to motivate an asynchronous updating in some communities that are interested in modelling genetic regulation with (B)ANs [65] :
(1) Simultaneity in nature is highly fortuitous, and (2) Simultaneity in nature maps bijectively onto synchronism in (B)ANs.
The notion of simultaneity implied in these assumptions requires a notion of "objective time" to make sense. A priori, in BANs, it doesn't. At least not spontaneously. What synchronism in BANs conveys is the absence of a causal relation:
Synchronously possible events are events that don't need one another to occur.
So the relation of synchronism relates possible events without specifying anything about how these events are otherwise related -that is, how they are related otherwise than by the relation created by their synchronous possibility. i.e. forcing asynchronism in x, @x P B n despite |U pxq| ą 1 possibly being true in some
x -contradicts the fact mentioned above ("In BANs synchronously possible events are events that don't need one another to occur"). To rule out the possibility of the synchronous occurrences of possible events by imposing asynchronous updatings, is to assume that the occurrence of any event prevents the occurrence of all other that are also possible -or else that the model conveys the causality that we expect very poorly.
In an asynchronous BAN, automata that find themselves synchronously unstable are 
Conclusion
The observations and examples given above call for a shift of attention from specifics and realism to definition and consistency. They show the need for us to systematically endeavour to refine and update our scientific views so that instead of speaking of theory and formalism as opposed to reality and nature, we rather speak of objects that are abstractions of one another in a sense of the term "abstraction" that we can actually formally explicit.
A characteristic strength (and beauty) of science is its ability and tradition of tackling problems and questions through many different angles. Science does not especially aspire at a one-dimensional history of science-making. Different perspectives currently upheld by different contemporary scientific communities may co-exist. They don't need to mutually invalidate one another since science doesn't especially need a single consistent "survivor scientific perspective" to be selected in the end. So if sciencemaking presently makes sense in itself, then the same way, having different scientific communities upholding different scientific perspectives on the same objects must 1 This absence of information conveyed by the relation of synchronism is a typical example of absence of information traditionally getting outshined by specialised knowledge and the assumptions inspired by specialised knowledge. If anything, what this absence of information represents is "wriggle room" (see [66] Section 9). And making sense out of it calls for the careful attention of Computer Science with its fundamental ability to soundly manipulate representations of information and systems, much more than it is calls for the other natural sciences' specialised detailed knowledge about the complexity and diversity of real life systems in need of modelling.
presently make sense in itself too. We have yet to study and explicit the general coherence there must thereby be in the present coexistence of those perspectives 2 .
This paper suggests that the minimalist formalism of BANs may be of value in that.
Science has been concentrating on a certain kind of information, emerging directly from objects, from the explicit statements we make about them. The BAN examples above suggest that if we want to rely on the representations we make for ourselves of the objects we take interest in, then we need to have practical in-depth understanding of how a piece of information's meaning and formalisation relate to one another.
The five observations of this paper undercut the assumption that there are representations that are fundamentally more "objective" -as in more "accurate", more "complete"
or more "realistic" -than others. In that, they undercut the necessity of restricting ourselves to looking for new information where beacons the information we already have precisely as we presently represent it and precisely as we presently interpret it.
Let us assume the following. (1) There is such a thing as changes of perspective that makes sense with respect to science-making. In other terms, there are differences in perspectives that are meaningful in science. 
